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This paper provides the first willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates in support of a national climate-change
policy that are comparable with the costs of actual legislative efforts in the U.S. Congress. Based on
a survey of 2,034 American adults, we find that households are, on average, willing to pay between
$79 and $89 per year in support of reducing domestic greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions 17 percent
by 2020. Even very conservative estimates yield an average WTP at or above $60 per year. Taking
advantage of randomized treatments within the survey valuation question, we find that mean WTP
does not vary substantially among the policy instruments of a cap-and-trade program, a carbon tax,
or a GHG regulation. But there are differences in the sociodemographic characteristics of those willing
to pay across policy instruments. Greater education always increases WTP. Older individuals have
a lower WTP for a carbon tax and a GHG regulation, while greater household income increases WTP
for these same two policy instruments. Republicans, along with those indicating no political party
affiliation, have a significantly lower WTP regardless of the policy instrument. But many of these
differences are no longer evident after controlling for respondent opinions about whether global warming
is actually happening.
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The United States has experienced a changing landscape of potential policy instruments for the 
regulation of greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions. Though no policy has been implemented at the 
national level, two recent efforts in the U.S. Congress centered on a “cap-and-trade” system of 
emission permits, whereby emissions would be capped at a maximum level, and firms could buy 
and sell pollution permits under the cap. More recently, many economists have advocated for a 
carbon tax on GHG emissions (e.g., Metcalf and Weisbach 2009; Nordhaus 2010), citing the 
climate and energy benefits, ease of administration, and potential government revenues. At 
present, however, the attention of policymakers is focused on the prospect of GHG regulation 
under authority of the Clean Air Act, with specific standards to be promulgated by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (US EPA 2011). 
  Despite variation among the policy instruments for reducing emissions, debate about 
climate-change policy in the U.S. often centers more directly on the costs of taking action. 
Contributing to the debate is the fact that little evidence exists on the economic benefits of 
climate-change policy and on the political acceptability of different policy instruments.
1 Here we 
begin to fill these gaps with benefit estimates based on households’ willingness-to-pay (WTP) to 
reduce domestic GHG emissions. The estimates are based on a stated-preference (i.e., contingent 
valuation) question included in two nationally representative surveys, one in 2010 and one in 
2011, with a combined sample size of 2,034 American adults. While acknowledging that stated-
preference estimates of WTP are sometimes questioned, we believe the estimates reported in this 
paper make an important contribution to the literature. Stated-preference surveys are the only 
way to estimate total economic value, which includes use values and non-use values and 
considerations for future generations; and the results of our survey provide the first WTP 
estimates of a national climate policy that are comparable with the costs of legislative efforts that 
have taken place in the U.S. Congress. The estimates thus establish a useful benchmark for other 
studies and policy analysis. 
  Beyond the benefit estimates themselves, the paper also contributes to the literature on 
policy-instrument choice. We include in the valuation question three randomized treatments for 
                                                 
1 A notable and recent exception with respect to the benefits of avoiding GHG emissions comes from the social cost 
of carbon estimates produced by the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon (2010) for purposes 
of regulatory impact analysis. The cost estimates can be interpreted as the marginal avoided damages (i.e., benefits) 
of reducing GHG emissions.  2 
 
the choice of policy instrument: a cap-and-trade program, a carbon tax, and a GHG regulation. 
These three policy instruments have received the greatest attention and serve as the basis for 
most political debate; here we investigate the ways that instrument choice affects WTP. While 
the costs associated with different policy instruments may differ, economic theory implies that 
the benefits of meeting an emissions target should be invariant to instrument choice. Whether 
such invariance holds is therefore an important question of political economy. We emphasize 
that even if one questions the magnitudes of our WTP estimates, many of our findings are of 
interest because they are based on relative comparisons of randomized treatments, among which 
any methodological biases are constant.  
We find that mean WTP of U.S. households to reduce domestic GHG emissions 17 
percent by 2020—that is, the near-term target specified in recent U.S. House and Senate bills—
ranges between $79 and $89 per year for the next ten years. These estimates meet or exceed the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) lower-bound estimates of meeting the target 
through the House and Senate bills. Importantly, this result holds despite the fact that the cost 
estimates for the House and Senate bills include additional reductions of at least 80 percent by 
2050, meaning that our WTP estimates should be considered an underestimate of the benefits for 
purposes of comparison. The results thus provide evidence in contrast to frequently made 
arguments that the costs of GHG policies are grossly disproportionate to the received benefits. 
Even our most conservative estimates, in which we treat “don’t know” responses to the valuation 
question a representing a WTP of zero, yield an average household WTP that ranges between 
$58 and $70 per year. 
  We find empirical evidence that mean WTP does not vary substantially among the policy 
instruments of a cap-and-trade-program, a carbon tax, or a GHG regulation. But the 
sociodemographic characteristics do differ among those willing to pay for emission reductions 
under different policy instruments. Greater levels of educational attainment increase WTP 
regardless of the policy instrument. Older individuals have a lower WTP for a carbon tax or a 
GHG regulation, while greater household income increases WTP for these same two policy 
instruments. Republicans, along with those indicating no political party affiliation, have a 
significantly lower WTP for all three policy instruments. Nevertheless, most of the differences 
due to political party affiliation no longer hold after controlling for whether respondents think 
that global warming is happening. People who are very sure that global warming is happening 3 
 
have a WTP that is significantly higher than those who think it is not happening and those who 
think it is happening with less certainty. But even after accounting for these differences, when it 
comes to support for a carbon tax in particular, Republicans continue to have a significantly 
lower WTP. 
 
2. Background on Leading Efforts for U.S. Climate-Change Policy  
On June 26, 2009 the U.S. House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy and 
Security Act (ACES). Though it did not become law, the bill would have established targets for 
the reduction of domestic carbon-dioxide emissions and achieved them primarily through a cap-
and-trade system. Among the key targets were a 17-percent reduction in emissions (below 2005 
levels) by 2020 and an 80 percent reduction by 2050. In the Senate, the American Power Act 
(APA) was introduced as a draft bill on May 12, 2010 and also sought to establish a cap-and-
trade system with similar emission targets, a 17-percent reduction by 2020 and an 83-percent 
reduction by 2050. A vote on the Senate bill was never taken despite much political attention 
during the summer of 2010. 
  Opposition to both the House and Senate bills tended to focus (and still does) on the 
economy-wide costs of reducing emissions. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates 
that ACES would cost the average American household $175 per year (in $2010s) (CBO 2009). 
A comparable analysis by the EPA finds that ACES would cost households between $74 and 
$117 per year (US EPA 2010a). In a separate study, the EPA also estimates the cost of 
implementing APA, with estimates ranging from $79 to $146 per household per year (US EPA 
2010b).  
  Missing from the debate, however, is evidence on the economic benefits of addressing 
climate change through the emissions targets of such legislation. As explained in the U.S. EPA 
Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses, the economic benefits of an environmental policy 
are measured as the public’s WTP to obtain the specified change in environmental quality (US 
EPA 2010c). In what follows, therefore, we focus on estimates of household WTP to reduce 
domestic GHG emission 17 percent by 2020—that is, the near-term target specified in both the 
House and Senate bills.  Our WTP benefit estimates are thus roughly comparable with the EPA’s 
estimates of household costs. We say roughly comparable because the CBO and EPA estimates 
include the cost of emission reductions of 17 percent by 2020 and also further reductions of at 4 
 
least 80 percent by 2050. For purposes of comparison, therefore, our measure of WTP should be 
interpreted as an underestimate with respect to the ultimate emission target itself. 
  Currently, however, the EPA is exercising its authority under the Clean Air Act to 
regulate carbon dioxide as a pollutant, set targets for emission reductions, and establish 
mechanisms for achieving them. In December 2010, for example, the EPA signed settlement 
agreements with fossil fuel power plants and petroleum refineries, which comprise 40 percent of 
U.S. GHG emissions, for new performance standards (US EPA 2011). This expansion of EPA’s 
regulatory authority is highly controversial, and specific rules will require benefit-cost analyses 
under Presidential Executive Order 12866 (US EOP 1993). Hence, there is a need for 
information on the benefits of GHG emission reductions and on how public support may differ 
among the choice of policy instruments. 
 
3. Data Collection and Survey Design 
We conducted two surveys of Americans aged 18 and older using the nationally representative 
online research panel of Knowledge Networks. The surveys were conducted approximately one 
year apart: the first between May 15 and June 1, 2010 and the second between April 23 and May 
12, 2011. The samples were independent with sizes of 1,024 and 1,010 adults, respectively, 
yielding a total sample size of 2,034 observations. The surveys were designed to evaluate public 
attitudes and knowledge about an array of climate and energy issues. 
  Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the sociodemographic characteristics of 
respondents by survey year. Most of the variables are very consistent between the two samples. 
On average, respondents have between 13 and 14 years of education, are 48 percent male, are 46 
years old, have household incomes between $57,000 and $61,000, and have less than 3 people 
living in the household.
2 With respect to political party affiliation, just under a quarter align with 
the Republican party, while the same fraction categorize themselves as Independents. The only 
notable difference between surveys relates the fraction of respondents spilt between the 
                                                 
2 The annual household income variable is based on taking the mid-point values of 19 possible categorical 
responses; for example, a response of “$50,000 to $59,999” was coded as $55,000. The highest response category 
was “$170,000 or more,” which we top coded at $187,000. 5 
 
Democratic party and indicating No Party.
3 The former drops from 38 to 31 percent, while the 
latter increases from 16 to 20 percent from 2010 to 2011. 
  We take advantage of two survey questions pertaining to respondent believes about 
climate change. The first question was written as follows:  
 
Recently, you may have noticed that global warming has been getting some 
attention in the news. Global warming refers to the idea that the world’s average 
temperature has been increasing over the past 150 years, may be increasing more 
in the future, and that the world’s climate may change as a result. What do you 
think? Do you think that global warming is happening? (select one answer) 
 
  “Yes,” “No,” or “Don’t know” 
 
Table 1 summarizes responses to this question: 18 percent answered “no” in both years; those 
answering “don’t know” decreased from 21 to 18 percent from 2010 to 2011; and those 
answering “yes” increased from 61 to 64 percent. The second question was a follow-up 
conditional on having answered “yes”: 
 
How sure are you that global warming is happening? (select one answer) 
 
    “Not at all sure,” “Somewhat sure,” “Very sure,” or “Extremely sure” 
 
To simplify interpretation of subsequent analysis, we collapse the categorical responses to this 
question into a dummy variable indicating whether a respondent answered at least “very sure.” 
As shown in Table 1, conditional on thinking that global warming is happening, 57 percent of the 
respondents are at least very sure that it is happening.
4 Both of these questions on respondent 
beliefs about global warming preceded the valuation question, which we now discuss and is our 
focus in this paper. 
  The survey included a valuation question that asked respondents their WTP to reduce 
domestic GHG emissions 17 percent by 2020. As part of the valuation question, we also included 
randomized treatments to investigate the potential effect of policy-instrument choice. The three 
                                                 
3 The response category of No Party was actually worded in the survey “No party/not interested in politics.” We also 
combined in this category a response of “Other, please specify,” which accounted for only 3 percent of the sample. 
4 For completeness, we report the unweighted distribution of all four response categories: 4 percent for “not at all 
sure,” 41 percent for “somewhat sure,” 34 percent for “very sure,” and 22 percent for “extremely sure.” 6 
 
policy instruments were a “cap-and-trade policy,” a “carbon-tax policy,” and a “policy to 
regulate carbon dioxide as a pollutant.” As discussed previously, these policy instruments are the 
three that have received the greatest attention and serve as the basis for most political debate. 
The specific question and response categories were as follows, where respondents were 
instructed to choose one of the specified dollar amounts or “don’t know”: 
 
Congress is considering a [randomize “cap-and-trade policy” or “carbon tax 
policy” or “policy to regulate carbon dioxide as a pollutant”] that would reduce 
U.S. greenhouse gas emissions 17% by 2020. This policy would increase the cost 
of living for all American households. In support of this policy, what is the 
maximum amount your household would be willing to pay each year for the next 
10 years? (select one answer) 
 
  $0, $26, $60, $121, $157, $193, $250, $475 or more, Don’t know   
 
There was, however, one slight difference between the 2010 and 2011 questions. The 2011 
question was exactly as indicated, but the 2010 version included only an GHG “policy” as the 
third treatment. This treatment was originally included as a comparison category for the cap-and-
trade and carbon tax treatments, but because attention became focused on the likelihood of EPA 
regulating carbon dioxide as a pollutant, we chose to modify language of the treatment to more 
closely match the actual policy debate. We assume that respondents to the 2010 version of the 
survey interpret “policy” as some type of regulation comparable to the language in the 2011 
version of the survey. We henceforth refer to these treatments as a “GHG regulation,” and as we 
discuss later, we test for the validity of considering both as similar treatments.  
  Our choice of WTP increments for the survey question was based on a review of the 
literature. Existing studies provided useful, though not directly applicable, insights for 
developing priors about the WTP distribution. The existing studies differed from ours because 
they considered a smaller geographic area, such as the Front Range in Colorado (Layton and 
Brown 2000), student samples of convenience (Cameron 2005; Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2006), or 
a policy of different scope than was valued in our study (Viscusi and Zeckhauser 2006). 
Nevertheless, using the existing results for guidance, we set two middle amounts of $157 and 
$193. We avoided using numbers of $150 or $200 because our experience is that people are 
more likely to answer yes to even amounts than odd numbers that are very close. Thus, our 7 
 
selection of bid amounts adds conservatism to the design of the valuation question, which is 
consistent with the recommendations of the NOAA Panel that set guidelines for the conduct of 
contingent-valuation surveys (Arrow et al. 1993). We then selected two WTP amounts that were 
lower ($60 and $121) and higher ($250 and $475).  We then include $0 for those who would not 
pay anything, or close to nothing, for a 17 percent reduction in GHG emissions. Finally, we 
added $26 based on evidence that many people are likely willing to pay at least a modest amount 
in support of policies to reduce GHGs. 
  Table 2 reports the percentage distributions of responses to the valuation question by 
survey year and policy treatment. Very few respondents refused to answer the WTP question, 
and just over 20 percent answered “don’t know” for each treatment in each year. Among 
respondents not willing to pay anything, there is a noticeable decline from 34 to 26 percent for 
cap-and-trade between 2010 and 2011. The percentages remain steadier for the two alternatives,  
31 percent for a carbon tax or 30 to 26 percent for a GHG regulation. In general, the frequency 
tends to decrease with the dollar amounts, with the exception of a pulse at $250, which is 
somewhat higher than the percent choosing the next higher category of $475 or more. We now 
turn to questions about how sociodemographic variables and the policy treatments explain the 
pattern of these responses, which are then used to derive estimates of WTP. 
 
4. Analysis of Willingness-to-Pay Responses 
We begin with an analysis of what explains the “don’t know” responses to the valuation 
question. The challenges of climate change communication to the public are well-known, and 
public opinion can be an important influence on the success or failure of policy proposals. It is 
thus important to understand the factors that explain why some people are unsure about their 
own WTP in support of climate-change policy. To study the question, we estimate linear 
probability models in which the dependent variable indicates whether the respondent answered 
“don’t know” to the valuation question. The independent variables are the sociodemographic 
characteristics of the respondent. We estimate and report separate models for each policy 
treatment in each year.
5 
                                                 
5 We also estimated pooled models and conducted likelihood-ratio tests to determine whether the set of 
sociodemographic variables explain the “don’t know” responses in a way that differs significantly by both policy 
instrument and year. Because the results were mixed, we report separate models for each treatment and year. For 
completeness, however, the results of the likelihood-ratio tests for pooling of the “don’t know” models in Table 3 8 
 
  Table 3 reports the linear probability models of “don’t know” responses. Greater 
education tends to decrease the probability that a respondent answers “don’t know,” and the 
result is statistically significant for a carbon tax in 2010 and a GHG regulation in 2011. Males 
tend to be less likely to respond “don’t know”, especially when asked about cap-and-trade in 
2010, when they were 13.4 percentage points less likely to respond “don’t know” than female 
respondents. Respondents in larger households tended to be more likely to respond “don’t know” 
for policy treatments in 2011. The effect is largest for cap-and-trade, whereby an additional 
person in the household increases the probability of a “don’t know” response by roughly 4 
percentage points. When statistically significant, greater income decreases the probability of a 
“don’t know” response, as is the case for cap-and-trade and a carbon tax in 2011, in which cases 
a $10,000 increase in annual household income increases the probability of a “don’t know” 
response approximately one percentage point. There is evidence that older respondents are more 
likely to respond “don’t know” for a GHG regulation in 2010 and a carbon tax in 2011. 
  We find that Republicans and Independents are less likely to answer “don’t know” than 
are Democrats, the omitted category. The coefficient estimates on these variables are negative in 
10 of 12 instances, and are negative and statistically significant in four instances. When it comes 
to a carbon tax, Republicans are significantly less likely to respond “don’t know;” they are 18 
and 13 percentage points less likely than Democrats in 2010 and 2011, respectively. 
Independents are 16 percentage points less likely than Democrats to answer “don’t know” for a 
carbon tax in 2011, and they are 13 percentage points less likely for cap-and-trade in 2010. 
Respondents with the No party categorization are not statistically different from Democrats in 
any of the models. 
  The most robust results are for the variables “global warming ‘no’” and “global warming 
‘yes,’” which are interpreted relative to “global warming ‘don’t know,’” the omitted category. 
People who think that global warming is not happening are significantly less likely to answer 
“don’t know” about their WTP in five of the six cases. People who think that global warming is 
happening are also significantly less likely to answer “don’t know,” but only for the policies in 
2011. Moreover, when comparing the two groups to each other in 2011, we find statistically 
significant differences for cap-and-trade and a carbon tax (both with p < 0.05); in both cases, 
                                                                                                                                                             
are the following: 2010 models 
2 = 42.08, p = 0.01; 2011 models 
2 = 28.54, p = 0.16; cap-and-trade models 
2 = 
12.03, p = 0.36; carbon tax models 
2 = 32.26, p = 0.00; GHG regulation models 
2 = 20.17, p = 0.04. 9 
 
those who think global warming is happening, compared to those who do not, are roughly 13 
percentage points more likely to respond “don’t know.” These results suggest that that while 
there are more people who think global warming is happening than is not happening (64 vs. 18 
percent in 2011, Table 1), people who think global warming is happening are less certain about 
their WTP in support policies to reduce GHGs. One possible explanation of these results is that 
even individuals who think global warming is happening are still unclear about how policies to 
reduce domestic GHGs will affect global warming. 
While it is not surprising that people who have more certain opinions about global 
warming would be less likely to answer “don’t know” to questions about WTP for policies to 
reduce GHG emissions, it is somewhat surprising that people who are certain the global warming 
is happening were not less likely to answer “don’t know” in 2010. A potentially related 
observation is that fewer coefficient estimates are statistically significant in 2010 than 2011.  In 
2010 the number of variables with significant coefficients ranges from one (GHG regulation) to 
four (carbon tax) and the range for 2011 is four (cap-and-trade) to six (carbon tax). Together, 
these results suggest that as discussions about global warming and GHG emissions have 
progressed over time, people may be becoming more organized (for good or bad) in their 
thinking and preferences about the problem and potential solutions. 
We now turn to analysis of WTP responses to the valuation question. Consider a model in 
which a respondent’s true WTP is a linear function of his or her sociodemographic 
characteristics: WTP* =  + X + , where WTP* is a respondent’s true but unobserved WTP, 
X is a vector of sociodemographic variables, and  is a normally distributed error term. Despite 
not observing WTP*, it is possible to obtain unbiased estimates of  and  using a censored 
regression model, whereby for each respondent we only observe whether WTP* lies somewhere 
within an interval [a,b], as is the case with our data.
6    
  We first estimate models excluding the “don’t know” and refusal responses, as is 
standard practice when analyzing stated-preference data and has been shown as legitimate for 
maintaining sample representativeness (Krosnick et al. 2002). As a point of comparison, 
however, we later include the observations in models that conservatively assume these responses 
                                                 
6 Specifically, the response categories to our valuation question lead to a natural censoring as follows: $0   [0,26), 
$26  [26,60), $60  [60,121), $121  [121,157), $157  [157,193), $193  [193,250), $250  [250,475), 475 or 
more  [475,). 10 
 
represent a WTP of zero (Carson et al. 1998). We report in Table 4 the results based on data 
pooled by year and separately for each of the three policy instruments.
7 
  Columns (1) through (3) in Table 4 report results for the first set of models, which 
include the socio-demographic variables but not those about whether respondents think global 
warming in happening (we include those next). There are no statistically significant differences 
in WTP responses between the 2010 and 2011 surveys, as indicated by the coefficient on the 
dummy variable for Year 2011 in all three models. We find that higher educational attainment is 
associated with greater WTP for all three policy instruments: each year of education increases 
WTP somewhere between roughly $4 and $6 per year. While gender has no statistically 
significant effect on WTP regardless of the policy instrument, household size has a negative and 
significant effect on WTP through a carbon tax, whereby an additional member of the household 
decreases WTP by approximately $11. Household income has a positive effect on WTP for a 
carbon tax and a GHG regulation; a $10,000 increase in annual household income increases 
annual WTP nearly $6 and just over $2 for the two policy instruments, respectively. Older 
respondents have a lower WTP for these same two instruments, with magnitudes such that an 
additional year decreases WTP close to $1. Regarding political party affiliation, the WTP of 
Republicans is significantly less than that for Democrats in all three cases with magnitudes of 
$37 for cap-and-trade, $55 for a carbon tax, and $54 for a GHG regulation. Independents are not 
statistically different from Democrats, but respondents with No party affiliation are, with a lower 
WTP of $25 for cap-and-trade, $32 for a carbon tax, and $33 for a GHG regulation. 
  The models in columns (4) through (6) include the variables on whether respondents 
think global warming is happening and, for those who think “yes,” the further indicator for 
whether they are at least “very sure.” Results for the new variables are of interest themselves, but 
their inclusion in the models has noteworthy effects on the other coefficients as well, which is 
why we present both sets of specifications. Compared to those who are unsure about whether 
global warming is happening (the omitted category), respondents who think it is not happening 
have a lower WTP. The result is statistically significant for cap-and-trade and a GHG regulation, 
whereby WTP is $28 lower in both cases. Results for those who think global warming is 
                                                 
7 Here again, for completeness, we report the likelihood-ratio test results that support our level of data aggregation 
for the models reported in Table 4. Based on the specifications in columns (1) through (3), the test results are as 
follows: cap-and-trade models 
2 = 13.67, p = 0.19; carbon tax models 
2 = 15.04, p = 0.13; GHG regulation models 

2 = 11.94, p = 0.29; pooling all three policy instruments for both years 
2  = 76.01, p = 0.01 11 
 
happening are estimated separately for respondents who are less sure and those who are at least 
very sure. Coefficients on “global warming ‘yes’” correspond with the less sure respondents, and 
while the sign of all three coefficients is positive, only the one for cap-and-trade is statistically 
significant, indicating a greater WTP of $22. Note that this is $50 more than for those who think 
global warming is not happening. But the differences are even more pronounced for those who 
are at least very sure that global warming is happening. All of the coefficients on “global 
warming ‘yes, very sure’” are positive and statistically significant and are interpreted as the 
difference in WTP between those who are at least very sure and those who are less sure that 
global warming is happening. The results clearly show that greater confidence in one’s opinion 
has a large effect on WTP, between $54 and $60 for all three policy instruments. Moreover, the 
difference between these respondents and those who think global warming is not happening is 
$108 for cap-and-trade, $89 for a carbon tax, and $97 for a GHG regulation.
8  
  Differences in the results between columns (1)-(3) and (4)-(6) occur because of inclusion 
of the global warming questions as explanatory variables. While the qualitative pattern for most 
of the sociodemographic variables remains much the same, many of the coefficients have smaller 
magnitudes. There are, however, substantial differences in the effect of political party affiliation. 
After controlling for opinions about global warming, the WTP of Republicans is no longer 
statistically difference from that of Democrats, except when it comes to a carbon tax, in which 
case the magnitude is reduced 50 percent. Those indicating no party affiliation become 
statistically indistinguishable from Democrats in all three cases. Together, these differences point 
to the importance of understanding public opinion about climate change that goes beyond simply 
relying on political party affiliation, for without doing so, models of the type presented here are 
susceptible to significant omitted variable bias. 
  We also estimate, as mentioned above, models with the same specifications but including 
all the “don’t know” and refusal responses under the assumption that they represent a WTP of 
zero. We estimate these models to test the robustness of our results under a very conservative 
assumption about what the WTP might be of those who are unsure about or refuse to report their 
WTP. We report these results in an Appendix Table in parallel with those reported in Table 4. 
The general pattern of results remains quite similar, with some coefficients changing statistical 
                                                 
8 These numbers come from the difference between the coefficient on “global warming ‘no’” and the sum of the 
coefficients on “global warming yes’” and “global warming ‘yes, very sure.’”  12 
 
significance. One noticeable change is that Independents emerge as having a higher WTP than 
Democrats after controlling for opinions about whether climate change is happening. In general, 
however, the magnitudes of many coefficients become lower, and this is not surprising given that 
inclusion of the “don’t know” and refusal responses as indicating a WTP of zero effectively 
decreases the overall mean WTP, which we now discuss for models that both exclude and 
include these responses. 
  The final step of our analysis is to use the censored regression models to predict WTP* to 
reduce domestic GHG emissions 17 percent by 2020. Our approach is to simply predict WTP* 
using the estimated parameters for each observation upon which the models were estimated. This 
yields empirical distributions of WTP* that we use directly to calculate the weighted means, 95-
percent confidence intervals of the means, and medians. Table 5 reports the WTP results 
corresponding to the models that include the global warming opinion variables. Panel A includes 
the results based on models in Table 4 when “don’t know” and refusal responses are omitted 
from the analysis. The estimate of annual mean WTP for the next 10 years ranges from $79 for 
cap-and-trade to $89 for a GHG regulation, with a carbon tax in the middle at $85. Inspection of 
the confidence intervals indicates no significant differences between cap-and-trade and a carbon 
tax, and between a carbon tax and a GHG regulation. But, interesting, the confidence intervals do 
not overlap for cap-and-trade and a GHG regulation, suggesting that WTP is in fact higher for 
the latter. Panel B reports results based on the corresponding models that include “don’t know” 
and refusal responses as indicating a WTP of zero. Not surprisingly, the inclusion of these 
observations under such a conservative assumption has a significant effect on the results. Mean 
WTP decrease by approximately 25 percent: $58 for cap-and-trade, $63 for a carbon tax, and $70 
for a GHG regulation. With these estimates, the confidence intervals suggest no meaningful 
differences in WTP across policy treatments. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper provides the first WTP benefit estimates of a national climate policy that are 
comparable with the costs of actual legislative proposals considered by the U.S. Congress. The 
magnitude of mean WTP of households in support of a 17-percent reduction in domestic GHG 
emissions by 2020 stands in contrast to frequently made arguments that the costs of GHG 
policies are grossly disproportionate to the received benefits. Our analysis indicates that 13 
 
households are willing to pay, on average, between $79 and $89 per year in support of a 17-
percent reduction in emissions by 2020. Moreover, these estimates meet or exceed the EPA’s 
lower-bound estimates of actually meeting the target through either the Waxman-Markey bill in 
the House ($74 per household per year) or the Boxer-Kerry bill in the Senate ($79 per household 
per year). Importantly, this result holds despite the fact that the cost estimates for the House and 
Senate bills include additional reductions of at least 80 percent by 2050, meaning that our WTP 
estimates should be considered an underestimate of the benefits for purposes of comparison. The 
result implies that the average per household public benefit of implementing these policies may 
exceed the per household cost. Finally, even under a very conservative assumption, that survey 
respondents answering “don’t know” to the valuation question have a WTP of zero, we find 
substantial benefits, with an overall mean WTP at or above $60 per year.  
  There is, however, more to learn from our analysis than the benefit estimates themselves, 
due to the investigation of “don’t know” responses and especially the comparisons between 
randomized policy treatments. When asked about their WTP in support of climate-change policy, 
just over 20 percent of the survey respondents answered that they do not know. Regardless of the 
policy instrument, an important predictor of these responses is uncertainty about whether people 
think climate change is happening, and this is especially true in the more recent 2011 survey. The 
result emphasizes the importance of climate-change communication to the public in order the 
more clearly evaluate public support for various GHG policies. We also find that uncertainty 
about WTP tends to be greater among older respondents with less education, along with larger 
households and lower annual income. Interestingly, uncertainty about WTP also tends to be 
greater among Democrats compared to Republicans and Independents, and this effect appears 
strongest in 2011 when asked about emission reductions that would occur through a carbon tax. 
  When it comes to actual WTP responses, the explanatory power of sociodemographic 
variables differs across the policy treatments. Greater education always increases WTP, but 
household size decreases WTP, particularly when asked about a carbon tax. Older individuals 
have a lower WTP for a carbon tax and a GHG regulation, while greater household income 
increases WTP for these same policy instruments. Republican and No party respondents (who 
differ from Independents) have a significantly lower WTP in support of emission reductions 
regardless of the policy instrument, but their difference from Democrats is greatest when it 
comes to a carbon tax or a GHG regulation. Nevertheless, most of the differences due to political 14 
 
party affiliation no longer hold after controlling for whether respondents think that global 
warming is happening. People who are very sure that global warming is happening have a WTP 
that is significantly higher than those who think it is not happening and those who think it is 
happening with less certainty. But even after accounting for these differences, when it comes to 
support for a carbon tax, Republicans continue to have a significantly lower WTP. 
  In conclusion, policymakers will benefit from taking the insights of our analysis into 
account when they evaluate new initiatives for climate-change policy. The current state of affairs 
is one in which political support for cap-and-trade has diminished, supporters of a carbon tax are 
becoming more vocal, and the Obama administration is advocating GHG regulations through 
EPA authority. While the costs of different policy instruments are likely to differ, economic 
theory implies that the benefits of meeting a specific emissions target should be invariant to the 
instrument choice. We find empirical evidence that mean WTP for a 17-percent reduction of 
GHG emissions by 2020 does not vary in a substantial way among the policy instruments of a 
cap-and-trade-program, a carbon tax, or a GHG regulation. But the sociodemographic 
characteristics of who is willing to pay, and how much, does differ by the instrument choice. 
Combined, the empirical results of this paper support the notion of an economic justification for 
controlling domestic GHG emissions, but they illuminate the ways in which policy-instrument 
choice can significantly affect public support.  15 
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Table 1: Summary statistics of respondent 
sociodemographic characteristics by year of survey 
 
 Survey  year 
Variable 2010  2011 
Education (years)  13.40  13.46 
   (2.63)  (2.61) 
Male (1=yes)  0.48  0.48 
   (0.50)  (0.50) 
Household size (# people)  2.72  2.87 
   (1.60)  (1.69) 
Income ($s)  56,605  60,826 
   (43,265)  (45,516) 
Age (years)  45.96  45.89 
   (16.25)  (16.92) 
Republican (1=yes)  0.22  23.4 
   (0.41)  (0.42) 
Democrat (1=yes)  0.38  30.9 
   (0.49)  (0.46) 
Independent (1=yes)  0.23  0.23 
   (0.42)  (0.42) 
No party (1=yes)  0.16  0.20 
   (0.37)  (0.40) 
Global warming “don’t know”  0.21  0.18 
 (0.41)  (0.38) 
Global warming “no”  0.18  0.18 
 (0.39)  (0.38) 
Global warming “yes”  0.61  0.64 
 (0.49)  (0.50) 
Global warming “yes, very sure”  0.57  0.54 
 (0.50)  (0.50) 
Notes: Reported statistics are means and standard deviations (in 
parentheses) weighted for sample representativeness. The number of 
observations for all sociodemographic variables is 1024 and 1010 
for the 2010 and 2011 surveys, respectively. There are 3 and 12 
missing observations for the two surveys, respectively, for the 
global warming questions. The reported proportions for the “yes, 
very sure” global warming question are conditional on having 






Table 2: Percentage distribution of willingness-to-pay responses by 
policy instrument and survey year 
 















$0  34.1 31.4  29.6 25.8 30.5  26.2 
           
$26  15.2 16.0  15.1 14.6 14.8  12.9 
             
$60  10.3 12.5  12.1 16.3 15.4  16.4 
             
$121  6.0 6.7  8.5 7.7 8.1  10.1 
             
$157  4.0 2.3  4.2 2.6 1.7  2.8 
             
$193  0.9 0.9  1.2 1.4 1.2  1.9 
             
$250  3.2 4.9  6.0 4.0 4.4  3.8 
             
$475  or  more  3.4 2.3  1.8 2.9 2.6  2.8 
             
Don’t  know  22.9 21.2  21.5 22.9 20.4  20.2 
             
No answer  0.00  1.7  0.00  1.7  0.9  2.8 
           
Observations  349 344  331 349 344  317 






Table 3: Linear probability models of “don’t know” responses to the willingness-to-pay question 
by policy treatment and year of survey 
 
  2010 Survey  2011 Survey 













Education -0.013  -0.039***  0.003  -0.008  0.001  -0.018* 
   (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.011) 
Male -0.134***  -0.092*  -0.032 -0.018  0.017  -0.102** 
   (0.049)  (0.047)  (0.045)  (0.046)  (0.043)  (0.046) 
Household size  -0.001  -0.013  -0.001  0.043**  0.019  0.041*** 
   (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.015) 
Income ($10,000s)  -0.005  0.002  0.003  -0.010*  -0.012**  -0.004 
   (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
Age 0.002  -0.000  0.005***  -0.001  0.003**  0.003 
   (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Republican -0.070  -0.175***  0.009  -0.065  -0.130**  0.038 
   (0.066)  (0.066)  (0.064)  (0.065)  (0.061)  (0.065) 
Independent -0.133**  -0.094  -0.003 -0.093  -0.160***  -0.028 
   (0.065)  (0.061)  (0.062)  (0.065)  (0.059)  (0.060) 
No party  -0.040  -0.007  0.087  -0.034  -0.072  0.095 
   (0.070)  (0.071)  (0.069)  (0.064)  (0.063)  (0.071) 
Global warming “no”  -0.125*  -0.210***  -0.090 -0.265***  -0.384***  -0.229*** 
 (0.074)  (0.077)  (0.073)  (0.077)  (0.077)  (0.078) 
Global warming “yes”  -0.009  0.063  -0.034  -0.131**  -0.252***  -0.155** 
 (0.059)  (0.058)  (0.059)  (0.063)  (0.059)  (0.062) 
Constant 0.538***  0.906***  -0.029  0.509***  0.375**  0.420** 
 (0.182)  (0.175)  (0.170)  (0.174)  (0.172)  (0.188) 
            
Observations 348  337  330  341  341  307 
R-squared 0.088  0.139  0.042  0.083  0.152  0.124 
Notes: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether the respondent answered “don’t know” to the valuation 
question. All regressions are weighted for sample representativeness. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Democrat 
is the omitted category for political party, and “global warming ‘don’t know’” is the omitted category for the global 
warming question. The relatively few respondents that refused to answer the WTP question are excluded from the 
models reported here. One, two, and three asterisk(s) indicate statistical significance at the 90-, 95- and 99 percent 
levels, respectively. 





Table 4: Censored regression models of willingness-to-pay responses by policy treatment 
 
 Model 













Education 6.240***  5.490***  3.678*  5.702***  4.088**  3.566** 
   (1.910)  (1.735)  (1.879)  (1.711)  (1.660)  (1.758) 
Male -3.813  10.555  2.464  -0.534  8.853  2.235 
   (9.195)  (8.724)  (8.776)  (8.283)  (8.229)  (8.292) 
Household size  -1.766  -11.190***  -4.258  -2.063  -7.818***  -4.489 
   (3.447)  (3.062)  (3.010)  (3.081)  (2.913)  (2.822) 
Income ($10,000s)  0.801  5.768***  2.245*  1.210  5.077***  2.365** 
   (1.150)  (1.051)  (1.198)  (1.031)  (1.000)  (1.121) 
Age 0.349  -0.957***  -0.895***  0.398  -0.599**  -0.822*** 
   (0.293)  (0.294)  (0.312)  (0.263)  (0.284)  (0.293) 
Republican -37.343***  -54.552***  -54.066***  0.609  -28.190**  -18.034 
   (12.473)  (11.462)  (11.656)  (11.693)  (11.443)  (11.945) 
Independent -9.986  1.543  -18.636  12.005  17.533  8.532 
   (12.453)  (11.664)  (11.371)  (11.353)  (11.169)  (11.163) 
No party  -24.781*  -31.954**  -32.735**  -0.139  -18.327  -8.996 
 (13.612)  (13.251)  (13.869)  (12.360)  (12.710)  (13.340) 
Global warming “no”  --  --  --  -28.672**  -19.826  -28.129** 
       (13.077)  (13.707)  (14.025) 
Global warming “yes”  --  --  --  21.687*  9.062  14.408 
       (12.587)  (12.959)  (12.905) 
Global warming “yes, very sure”  --  --  --  57.742***  59.694***  54.216*** 
       (10.668)  (10.484)  (10.640) 
Year 2011  2.741  4.803  7.843  -5.473  -1.835  7.269 
 (9.217)  (8.636)  (8.942)  (8.289)  (8.211)  (8.409) 
Constant -1.888  61.274*  93.800***  -42.919  26.586  52.696 
 (33.130)  (32.563)  (33.745)  (31.025)  (31.609)  (32.838) 
            
Observations 532  536  504  529  535  502 
Notes: The dependent variable is the censored responses to the valuation question excluding the “don’t know” and missing 
responses. All regressions are weighted for sample representativeness. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Democrat is the 
omitted category for political party, and “global warming ‘don’t know’” is the omitted category for the global warming question.  







Table 5: Means, confidence intervals, and medians for willingness-to-pay 




 (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Cap-and-trade  Carbon  tax  GHG  regulation 
 
Panel A (excluding “don’t know” and non-response observations) 
 
Mean WTP  78.72  85.14  89.47 
95% confidence interval  74.84 – 82.61  80.41 – 89.88  85.54 – 93.40 
Median WTP  71.50  80.09  89.61 
Observations 529  535  502 
      
Panel B (including “don’t know” and non-response observations as WTP of zero) 
 
Mean WTP  57.61  63.17  69.80 
95% confidence interval  55.10 – 60.13  59.80 – 66.54  66.83 – 72.78 
Median WTP  55.80  60.74  67.97 
Observations 692  686  641 
Notes: Statistics report in Panel A correspond with predictions based on the 
corresponding censored regression models reported in columns (4), (5), and (6) of Table 
4. Those reported in Panel B correspond with models in columns (4), (5), and (6) in the 







Appendix Table: Censored regression models of willingness-to-pay responses by policy treatment and  
inclusion of “don’t know” and non-response observations 
 
 Model 













Education 5.846***  6.220***  3.947**  5.402***  5.011***  3.443** 
   (1.591)  (1.475)  (1.596)  (1.491)  (1.442)  (1.537) 
Male 3.621  12.701*  6.477  3.753  11.552*  6.360 
   (7.295)  (7.207)  (7.384)  (6.857)  (6.992)  (7.163) 
Household size  -3.228  -7.962***  -4.825** -4.009 -6.958***  -5.240** 
   (2.614)  (2.312)  (2.414)  (2.460)  (2.249)  (2.334) 
Income ($10,000s)  1.343  4.784***  1.256  1.488*  4.376***  1.463 
   (0.915)  (0.891)  (0.979)  (0.855)  (0.864)  (0.942) 
Age 0.241  -0.731***  -1.025***  0.253  -0.584**  -1.051*** 
   (0.225)  (0.238)  (0.261)  (0.211)  (0.234)  (0.253) 
Republican -18.630*  -27.737***  -38.859***  3.489  -9.660  -13.758 
   (9.877)  (9.585)  (9.796)  (9.587)  (9.921)  (10.200) 
Independent 5.934  15.322  -7.837  18.382*  25.987***  11.324 
   (10.018)  (9.594)  (9.630)  (9.485)  (9.437)  (9.697) 
No party  -13.587  -21.749**  -29.062***  0.559  -9.871  -14.050 
 (10.204)  (10.420)  (11.188)  (9.674)  (10.290)  (10.957) 
Global warming “no”  --  --  --  -17.550  -8.139  -16.458 
       (10.993)  (11.888)  (11.769) 
Global warming “yes”  --  --  --  19.117*  9.934  16.054 
       (10.029)  (10.196)  (10.599) 
Global warming “yes, very sure”  --  --  --  35.726***  43.636***  43.604*** 
       (8.705)  (8.764)  (9.206) 
Year 2011  3.396  6.615  4.682  -1.070  4.993  7.270 
 (7.261)  (7.111)  (7.413)  (6.808)  (6.884)  (7.144) 
Constant -25.939  4.629  77.951***  -50.071*  -14.303  51.986* 
 (27.027)  (26.603)  (27.833)  (25.924)  (26.246)  (27.725) 
            
Observations 698  688  648  692  686  641 
Notes: The dependent variable is the censored responses to the valuation question including the “don’t know” and missing 
responses as indicating a willingness-to-pay of zero. All regressions are weighted for sample representativeness. Standard errors 
reported in parentheses. Democrat is the omitted category for political party, and “global warming ‘don’t know’” is the omitted 
category for the global warming question.  One, two, and three asterisk(s) indicate statistical significance at the 90-, 95- and 99 
percent levels, respectively. 
 